Robertson Pugh

Posted by Max Hobbs on 14 July 2025

There is a fraud epidemic in the UK. At least, that is the view of the UK Government and of various respected commentators, such as RUSI. It is a reasonable conclusion when one considers the facts. Fraud is now the most prevalent crime against individuals in England and Wales, accounting for over 40% of all crime. The total cost of fraud to the UK is generally thought to be over £200bn a year and some studies put the total cost of economic crime to the UK as high as £350bn a year.[1]

Fraud is also notoriously difficult to identify and prosecute. There were approximately 4 million fraud incidents in 2024, up from approximately 3 million in 2023. However, only about one in seven of these were reported to the police or Action Fraud. As of 2023, fewer than 1% of cases received by Action Fraud resulted in an offender being charged or prosecuted for the crime.

Even high-profile cases have been hard to prosecute. In the (in)famous case of SFO v Barclays in 2018, the Serious Fraud Office failed to prosecute Barclays for alleged fraud in connection with fundraising in 2008, because it was found the relevant individuals were not the “directing mind and will” of the company.[2] The prosecution foundered on this point; as did the hopes of UK authorities being able to successfully prosecute other companies for fraud in the future.

To address these issues, at least in part, the UK Government introduced the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (ECCTA). Among other things, this included the new “failure to prevent fraud” (FTPF) offence, which is finally coming into force on 1 September 2025, to great fanfare. For example, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office has publicly stated he is “very, very keen to prosecute someone for that offence”. Industry commentators frequently observe that the fraud and compliance “landscape” is shifting and some have described this development as “momentous”. Companies are being told they need to consider whether they are ready and to prepare for the change.

However, as we approach 1 September, there are some important nuances to the offences (there are technically three offences being introduced, in sections 199(1)(a), (1)(b) and 199(2) ECCTA) that could be overlooked amid the excitement. These raise interesting questions about what companies really need to be focused on when considering their response to the new offences coming into force and whether ECCTA will succeed in its ultimate aim – to help prevent fraud.

[1] Clean Foundations for Growth: Unlocking Economic Opportunity by Tackling Economic Crime, All Party Parliamentary Group for Anti-Corruption & Responsible Tax, July 2025

[1] Serious Fraud Office v Barclays PLC [2018] EWHC 3055 (QB)

1. “Large organisations” – the offences apply to “large organisations” or subsidiaries of “large organisations”. The definition of “large organisation” is a body that satisfies two or more of: (i) turnover of more than £36m; (ii) balance sheet total of more than £18m; and (iii) more than 250 employees.

Less than 1% of businesses in the UK meet this definition. Arguably, the FTPF offences will therefore have very limited application. In their defence, the businesses within scope are estimated to account for almost half the turnover and almost 40 per cent of employment by all businesses. However, clearly one of the most important questions for companies to consider is whether they are even caught by the offences.

It should also be noted that the threshold(s) could be changed in the future by secondary legislation, so smaller companies could be brought within scope in due course. However, there are currently no indications that will happen.

2. “Intending to benefit” – another important nuance is that the offences do not apply to all instances of fraud. They only apply where fraud is committed by a person intending to benefit the organisation or a third party to whom the person provides services on behalf of the organisation.

This significantly narrows the potential application of the offences. It is difficult to imagine many circumstances in which a fraudster intends to benefit their employer, rather than just to enrich themselves. If we are considering companies created with the intention to perpetuate the sort of mass-scale frauds that constitute the UK’s “epidemic” – they are highly unlikely to be a “large organisations” or, if they are, they are likely to have dissipated any assets and effectively collapsed by the time a prosecution is brought. The value of the offences may therefore be limited.

Indeed, even in the Barclays case – which embodied a specific problem that ECCTA has been introduced to solve – this nuance may have caused issues. In that case, the offending in question related to allegedly fraudulent contracts under which Barclays paid out millions of pounds to Qatari entities. Making significant payments from an organisation may arguably not be for its benefit. Even if it were said the alleged fraudulent scheme was for the benefit of the organisation, that too could be contested. The Chairman of Barclays at the time expressed “shock and great anger” at what emerged in the investigation and said that if the Board had known the truth, they would never have authorised the arrangements and contracts. Again, whether or not the alleged offending was for the benefit of the company would not be a clear-cut issue. Intention, which is the key issue, can be extremely difficult to prove.

ECCTA has also brought in a new “identification” principle, which could be relied on to attribute wrongdoing of individuals to a corporate. This could fill the gap presented by the above problem. But if that is the case, then it raises the question of what benefit the FTPF offences add.

3. Jurisdiction – the Bribery Act 2010, which contained the first “failure to prevent” offence, is explicitly extra-territorial in its application, as is the failure to prevent tax evasion under the Criminal Finances Act 2017. However, the intention for the FTPF offences in ECCTA seems to be different. It is worth quoting in full paragraph 12 of the UK Government’s Impact Assessment of the FTPF offence, dated 17 March 2025. This states:

 “The offence will not have extra-territorial reach beyond the United Kingdom. The offence will only apply where the employee or associated person commits a relevant fraud offence under the law of part of the UK. This requires a UK nexus. By UK nexus, we mean that one of the acts which was part of the underlying fraud took place in the UK, or that the gain or loss occurred in the UK. This is different from the “failure to prevent bribery” offence, which applies if an organisation commits bribery outside the UK. This restriction will reduce the burden on organisations.”

This is a significant statement that indicates the scope for prosecuting the new offence is intended to be more limited than might otherwise be thought. This wording largely mirrors section 2.5 of the official guidance to the offences, published in November 2024.

The consensus among legal commentators is that the FTPF offences will have extraterritorial effect, because of the scope of the offences listed at Schedule 13 ECCTA. No doubt, the specifics of each case and alleged offence will have to be carefully scrutinised on this point. However, this clear statement within the Impact Assessment – including the explicit contrast drawn as against the Bribery Act 2010 and the wish to reduce the burden on organisations – sets a tone that may legitimately influence how companies choose to respond to the introduction of the offences.

It could also plausibly impact potential prosecutions, because those will have to focus on whether a company had in place reasonable prevention procedures. It is arguably reasonable for companies to be guided by official Government publications when making proportionate adjustments to their policies and procedures.

Conclusion

An express hope of ECCTA is that it will cause a culture and compliance shift within businesses throughout the UK, similar to the effect the Bribery Act had over a decade ago. This will bolster the “first line of defence” against fraud and financial crime in general. That is a realistic and laudable aim.

However, the FTPF offences and associated guidance have been expressly designed to not place too large a burden on companies. As described above, the companies within scope of the offences; the type of offending; and even the jurisdictional reach of the offences have all been curtailed to some degree. This nuance may be lost in the large volume of commentary that will accompany the offences coming into force on 1 September.

All companies – of any size – would be well advised to seriously engage with the financial crime risks to which they are exposed and mitigate them appropriately. But in doing so, companies should also be alive to the nuances of the FTPF offences and the important limits on them. Their response should be proportionate.

Robertson Pugh Associates LLP is well-placed to assist any organisation grappling with these issues. We have market-leading legal expertise supported by in-house investigation and due diligence capabilities. Please contact us if you or your organisation require assistance in this area.

[1] Clean Foundations for Growth: Unlocking Economic Opportunity by Tackling Economic Crime, All Party Parliamentary Group for Anti-Corruption & Responsible Tax, July 2025

[2] Serious Fraud Office v Barclays PLC [2018] EWHC 3055 (QB)